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Economic Institutions and Economic Growth 







The aim of this paper is to assess the importance of economic institutions, measured by an index 
built from the E.B.R.D. (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) indicators, for the 
pattern of economic growth. Though it focuses on a particular set of transition economies, it is also 
related to the literature on institutional development and economic growth. Indeed it draws on the 
literature on the economics of transition, looking at the breakdown of the U.S.S.R. as an extremely 
powerful “natural” experiment. 
From an empirical point of view, the study takes into consideration the period between 1991 and 
2008 for fifteen countries, namely the Former Soviet Union economies, and is performed by means 
of a panel model. The first part of the econometric analysis sees our index as the only independent 
variable. A static model and a dynamic one are specified and different estimation techniques used. 
The second phase includes other covariates, among which the classical determinants of growth, to 
test whether the institutional environment, that is to say, the economic institutions index, maintains 
the magnitude and has a major impact on the pattern of economic growth. 
 
 
JEL classification: C10, C23, C51, E02, E60, O11, O43, P20, P30. 
 
Keywords: economic growth, economic institutions, economic policy, Former Soviet Union 
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1. Introduction 
 
When the U.S.S.R. dissolved in 1991, the Soviet Socialist Republics that formed it in its final years 
gained independence. These Former Soviet Union Republics are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. U.S.S.R. was the successor to the Russian Empire of the 
Tsars and was established on December 1922. Its seventy years history is a “story” of systematic 
cohesion among political system, economic policy and economic structure, and gives the 
perspective to understand what happened to these economies after the breakdown.  
Generally speaking, this paper is related to two strands of literature. It is related to the literature on 
the growth experiences of transition economies and to the literature on institutional development 
and economic growth
1. Its focus is just on the FSU economies, unlike the literature about 
“transition”, especially on the path of their economic performance dictated by the evolution of a set 
of economic institutions, because we believe they are an extremely powerful experiment of 
institutional change. Thanks to their unique starting point and past common experience, it is 
possible to explain more accurately which dimensions of institutions are involved, thus avoiding the 
often pointed out drawback of very different meanings related to the word “institutions”, and to put 
forward a panel model analysis, thus following each country over several years. This approach is 
new for both strands of literature because it allows to disentangle the effects of a radical change of 
institutions, to improve the quantitative methods not only for the panel data analysis carried out but 
also for the development of a dynamic approach, to show conceptually the close relationship 
between economic policies and economic institutions necessary for a market economy, and to think 
back to the meaning of the word transition. 
The choice of Former Soviet Union countries is based not only on historical considerations. They 
are very different from the Central Eastern European (CEE) countries. The former are heritage of 
the Soviet Union, the latter are also called the Eastern bloc, i.e. countries that have experienced 
“communism”. The former have had a common
2 history, the latter a common soviet influence, 
although in different times and ways. Due to this, we can’t think the CEE countries have lived 
central planning in the same radical way. The central planning and its distortions are known to have 
affected the economic environment and if we are minded to believe in the existence of the proved 
link between economic growth and institutions, then the extremely explanatory power of the FSU 
countries can not be unrecognised. Thus, the focus on these economies is justified by looking at 
their past homogeneity in terms of direction, management, organization and control. At that very 
moment, they experienced the same institutional change: the authoritarian and highly centralized 
system ceased to be. Therefore, the Soviet breakdown is their common exogenous starting point. 
From this exogenous point, new institutions had to be created. More specifically, we define these 
new institutions as institutions necessary for a market economy, that is, private ownership, 
governance and competition policy, banking and financial institutions, trade and foreign exchange 
institutions, price liberalisation. In this sense, they are economic institutions. Attempts to establish 
these institutions have been done for several years. This paper explores, by means of an index, their 
impact on the path of economic growth over a period of eighteen years (1991-2008), at the end of 
which many countries still remain poor. How much important have these institutions been for 
economic outcome? Have they been important along the all time horizon? Have they been the only 
force shaping the economic path? What can be said about the word transition? 
From the empirical point of view, we approach in two steps. We first study their importance for the 
economic pattern in a static dimension, being careful about the statistical features of our dataset and 
the consequent problems for the estimated coefficients. Different estimation techniques are used 
and the model proves to be coherent. After establishing the effect of institutions according to this 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive review, see “What do we know about the link between growth and institutions?” 
2 The three Baltic Republics can partly be seen as an “exception”.  
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specification, we like studying the same relationship in a dynamic framework. We explore the 
autoregressive structure of the model, establish the number of lags of the dependent variable, apply 
different estimation techniques and show the supremacy of the Arellano Bond estimator. Then the 
magnitude and sign of our index of economic institutions are tested via a robustness analysis. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we trace and identify the key elements that 
can be seen as background for these countries. Section 3 is an overview of the previous research on 
transition. Section 4 explores the data, describes the variables used as institutional indicators and 
what they mean according to our analysis. Section 5 carries on with the econometric analysis. 
Section 5 shows the results of the robustness analysis, defines the variables used and, where 
necessary, how they have been constructed. Section 6 concludes. 
  
 
2. The common background 
 
Following the events started with 1917 Revolution, a few months after coming to power in 1918, 
the new regime initiated a series of unprecedented measures intended to destroy all vestiges of 
private property and inaugurate a centralized communist economy. These measures, named “War 
Communism” in 1921, had two strictly linked objectives: to nationalize the private ownership of the 
means of production (which provided the basis of political power) and to establish a centralized and 
planned economy.  
“War Communism” entailed four sets of measure: 
•  the nationalization of all the means of production and transportation; 
•  the abolition of money and its replacement by barter tokens as well as free goods and 
services; 
•  the imposition on the national economy of a single “plan”; 
•  the introduction of compulsory labour. 
In the first years of this new regime, all but the smallest industrial enterprises were nationalized. 
Agricultural land, the main source of national wealth, was for the time being left at the disposal of 
peasant communes, with the understanding that sooner or later it would be collectivised. Private 
ownership of urban real estate was abolished. The state became the sole owner of the country’s 
productive and income-yielding assets. Management of this wealth was entrusted to a gigantic 
bureaucratic organization, the Supreme Council of the National Economy, which was to allocate 
human and material resources in the most rational manner. Money was effectively destroyed by the 
unrestrained printing of banknotes, which led to an extraordinary inflation. Citizens lost their life 
savings. Barter and issuance by government agencies of free goods replaced normal commercial 
operations. Private trade, whether wholesale or retail, was forbidden. All adult citizens were 
required to work wherever ordered. The independence of trade unions was abolished and the right 
to strike against the nationalized enterprises outlawed.  
Except for a temporary compromise with capitalism (the program that came to be known as the New 
Economic Policy), during the decades following the Bolshevik Revolution and especially under 
Stalin, a complex system of planning and control had been developed, in which the state managed 
virtually all production activity. In the late 1920s, Stalin sought to rapidly transform the Soviet 
Union from a predominantly agricultural country into a modern industrial power. Between 1927 and 
1929 the State Planning Commission worked out the First Five-Year Plan, which called for rapid 
industrialization of the economy, with particular growth in heavy industry. The economy was 
centralized: small-scale industry and services were nationalized, managers strove to fulfil 
Gosplan's
3 output quotas, and the trade unions were converted into mechanisms for increasing  
 
                                                 
3 State Planning Committee. Under party guidance, it was primarily responsible for creating and monitoring five-year 
plans and annual plans.  
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Figure 1: Soviet Union Administrative Division 
 
worker productivity. With the greatest share of investment put into heavy industry, widespread 
shortages of consumer goods occurred, and inflation grew. To satisfy the state's need for increased 
food supplies, the First Five-Year Plan called for the organization of the peasantry into collective 
units that the authorities could easily control. This collectivisation program entailed compounding 
the peasants' lands and animals into collective farms and state farms. This heavily centralized and 
bureaucratised system of administration has characterized Soviet agriculture since Stalin’s 
campaign of forced collectivisation.  
From 1928 till 1990, there have been twelve Five-Year Plans to set the directions of the economy. 
The Plan has been the main instrument of strategic development, and the annual plan its short-term 
operational translation. From 1928 to 1985, the Soviet growth has followed a pattern called 
extensive growth
4: its main characteristic has been in generating growth mostly through the 
expansion of inputs and only marginally through rises in productivity.  The growth of fixed capital 
and the use of raw materials substantially exceeded the growth of national income, while the growth 
of the work force surpassed the growth of labour productivity.  
Along these years, on the whole, the regime established its economic priorities through central 
planning, a system under which administrative decisions rather than the market determined resource 
allocation and prices. As a result, the Soviet Union of the 1980s had the largest centrally directed 
economy in the world founded on “socialist ownership of the means of production” (as declared on 
1977 Constitution), where two forms of socialist ownership were recognised: state ownership, in 
which all members of society are said to participate, and various types of collective or cooperative 
ownership. The country’s economic resources were, of course, largely state owned. The central 
government controlled directly or indirectly aspects of the labour force, the retail and wholesale 
distribution system, trade, and the financial system. 
                                                 
4 See Gur Ofer and G.I.Khanin.  
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In particular, the banking system was highly centralized; it formed an integral part of the 
management of the economy. The State Bank, Gosbank, issued currency and established its official 
gold content and thus its exchange rate with foreign currencies. The real value of the ruble for 
purchase of domestic consumer goods in comparison with the United States dollar was very 
difficult to determine because the Soviet price structure, traditionally established by the State 
Committee on Prices, was dictated by many considerations other than supply and demand. The 
banking system was owned and managed by the government. Gosbank was the central bank of the 
country and also its only commercial bank. It handled all significant banking transactions, including 
the issuing and control of currency and credit, management of the gold reserve, and oversight of all 
transactions among economic enterprises. Because it held enterprise accounts, the bank could 
monitor their financial performance. It had main offices, in each union republic, and many smaller 
branches and savings banks. The banking system also included the Foreign Economic Activity 
Bank and the All-Union
5 Capital Investment Bank.  
Using CPSU
6 directives concerning major economic goals, planning authorities formulated short-
term and long-term plans for meeting specific targets in virtually all spheres of economic activity. 
Economic plans had the force of law. Traditionally they had been worked out down to the level of 
the individual economic enterprise, where they were reflected in a set of output goals and 
performance indicators that management was expected to maintain. Annual plans underlay the basic 
operation of the system. They covered one calendar year and encompassed the entire economy. 
Targets were set at the central level for the overall rate of growth of the economy, the volume and 
structure of the domestic product, the use of raw materials, labour and their distribution by sector 
and region, the volume and structure of exports and imports. Annual plans were broken down into 
quarterly and monthly plans, which served as commands and blueprints for the day-to-day operation 
of industrial and other economic enterprises and organizations. The Five-Year Plan provided 
continuity and direction by integrating the yearly plans into a longer time frame. Although the Five-
Year Plan was duly enacted into law, it contained a series of guidelines rather than a set of direct 
orders. At each congress, the party leadership presented the targets for the next Five-Year Plan. 
Thus each plan had the approval of the most authoritative body of the country’s leading political 
institutions. In economic policy matters, it was the Central Committee of the CPSU and, more 
specifically, its Politburo (the Political Bureau, which combined legislative and executive powers) 
that set basic guidelines for planning. The planning apparatus of the government was headed by the 
Council of Ministers
7 and, under it, the State Planning Committee (Gosplan). Gosplan combined 
the broad economic goals set forth by the Council of Ministers with data supplied by lower 
administrative levels regarding the current state of the economy in order to work out a set of control 
figures. When the control figures had been established by Gosplan, economic ministries drafted 
plans within their jurisdictions and directed the planning by subordinate enterprises. The control 
figures were sent in disaggregated form downward through the planning hierarchy to production 
and industrial associations (various groupings of related enterprises) or the territorial production 
complex
8, for progressively more detailed elaboration. Individual enterprises at the base of the 
planning pyramid were called upon to develop the most detailed plans covering all aspects of their 
operations
9. As the individual enterprise formulated its detailed draft production plans, the flow of 
information was reversed. The draft plans of the enterprises were sent back up through the planning 
hierarchy for review, adjustment, and integration. This process entailed intensive bargaining, with 
top authorities pressing for maximum and, at times, unrealisable targets, and enterprises seeking 
                                                 
5  National, with purview throughout the entire territory of the Soviet Union. 
6 Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
7 The highest executive and administrative body of the Soviet Union, according to the Constitution. In practice, its 
members directed most day-to-day state activities.   
8 An economic entity consisting of various economically related industrial and agricultural enterprises in a particular 
geographic area. 
9 In agriculture, individual collective farms and state farms worked under the supervision of local party committees.    
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assignments that they could reasonably expect to fulfil or even over fulfil. Ultimate review and 
revision of the draft plans by Gosplan and approval of a final all-union plan by the Council of 
Ministers, the CPSU, and the Supreme Soviet were followed by another downward flow of 
information, this time with amended and approved plans containing specific targets for each 
economic entity to the level of the enterprise. A parallel system for planning existed in each union 
republic and each autonomous republic. The state planning committees in the union republics were 
subject to the jurisdiction of both the councils of ministers in the union republics and Gosplan.  
At the all-union level, another agency formed the planning apparatus of the government: the State 
Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat), which assisted the State Planning Committee (Gosplan).  
The reliability of the Goskomstat’s data has been brought into question several times. Kudrov 
(1993) observes that from the time of the First Five-Year Plan, a “large-scale, systematic distortion 
of reality in published statistical information from top to bottom” began. From above, it was 
initiated by the ruling elite interested in demonstrating the success of its leadership and the 
superiority of central planning and of socialism as a social system. From below, there were 
distortions in statistics at enterprise level. These distortions, included in the statistical data, were 
somewhat dependent on that highly bureaucratised system. They hindered to determine the 
character and depth of the economic problems and reliable rates of growth. To this regard, these 
distortions applied basically to the production indices. According to official methodological 
explanations of Goskomstat of former USSR, total industrial output as a whole and within 
individual branches is determined as the sum of data on the volume of output of individual 
industrial enterprises, calculated according to the factory method. Kudrov outline four sources of 
distortion. First, statistics on industrial output in the USSR were based on gross output, not on value 
added. In this indicator there is an enormous degree of double counting due to the fact that the value 
of the same raw materials is counted in all stages of their manufacture. And if the organizational 
structure of industry changes in the direction of the fragmentation of large enterprises and the 
creation of a larger number of independent enterprises, the share of repeat counting grows, and 
consequently, if the number of links in the technological chain of processing raw materials 
increases, the growth of industrial output is artificially inflated. Second, the gross output indicator 
in the USSR was calculated entirely on the basis of complete reporting. In the factories, over 
reporting, the deliberate exaggeration of output to obtain additional bonuses and other rewards for 
winning in the “socialist competition”, the concealment of unfavourable facts became widespread. 
Third when enterprises evaluated the volume of their gross output, they used as comparable prices 
the prices of a remote base year that made it impossible to take into account changes in product mix 
and quality, and the advent of new types of products that did not in general have comparable prices. 
As a result, the industrial production index was greatly overstated. In practice, the inflation 
component entered into the calculation of industrial production indices. On the whole, calculations 
of utilized, like produced, national income of the former USSR contain enormous potential for 
distortion.  
This scenario of central planning, administrative decisions, management and control of the 
economy, started with the Revolution and maintained and evolved during the years of the 
authoritarian-dictatorial regime, is the common background of the fifteen countries studied. The last 
years of the USSR were characterized by the tasks of perestroika, that is, changing and 
restructuring economic mechanisms. This transformation, this restructuring, not aimed at 
“undermining the Soviet system but at making it more efficient”, according to many scholars
10, 
disorganized economic relations: it destroyed the administrative system without forming market 
relations. The economy entered a state of deep crisis and this was the key reason for the USSR’s 
collapse, engendering a historical change, that entailed a transition from something, the past, to 
something else, the new realities formed, and the creation of new institutions. From this common 
                                                 
10 See for example Blanchard (1997) and Khanin (1991).  
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background, that can be analytically conceived as exogenous, each former soviet socialist republic 
started its own new economic pattern.  
After a brief overview of the literature on transition, we define which kind of institutions we are 
thinking of, discuss their importance and how they have been measured. 
 
 
3. An overview of previous research on “transition” 
 
The empirical literature on transition considered starts in 1996. This literature focuses basically
11 on 
the members of the Warsaw Pact until 1991 and on some other Central Eastern European countries. 
The term Eastern Bloc was used to refer to the former Communist states of Eastern and Central 
Europe, including the countries of the Warsaw Pact, along with Yugoslavia and Albania which were 
not aligned with the Soviet Union after 1948 and 1960, respectively. These countries now can be 
either new nation states, member of decentralized states or core countries of centralized federal 
states.  
From a general point of view, this literature can be divided in two groups.  
The first deals with different forces in explaining output performance: 
•  the role of reforms and reform strategies 
•  the role of initial conditions 
•  the role of (a broadly concept of) institutions 
The second focuses on more specific characteristics for the transition economies: 
•  the importance of trade reform 
•  the determinants of corruption 
•  the unofficial economy as a consequence of political control 
 
Due to the essence of the transition, namely a transit to a market economy, the role of reforms is 
given remarkable attention. De Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996) study the role of liberalization over 
the 1989-1994 period. They develop an index, used later in many other papers, which is a weighted 
average of the rankings of liberalisation in internal markets
12, external markets
13 and private sector 
entry
14, and find that there are cross country relationships between GDP and economic 
liberalisation, and between inflation and economic liberalisation. Also Fisher, Sahay and Vegh 
consider reforms. They use the De Melo et al. liberalisation index, in a panel of twenty transition 
countries for 1992-1994, among the forces that are believed to account for the outcome differences. 
On one side, they consider macroeconomic policy (annual inflation rates and fiscal surpluses), 
official external assistance, the index of reforms (see De Melo et al., 1996), on the other, the growth 
rate of population, the secondary enrolment rate, and the share of investment in GDP. They find that 
the key to rapid growth in the transition economies is investment and the policies (macroeconomic 
policies that produce low inflation and the liberalisation index) that promote it. Later Fischer et al. 
(2000) increase the number of countries (from twenty to twenty-five) and, via three regressions run 
with panel data, conclude that both macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms are 
necessary for growth. Reforms seem to be important also for the process of resource reallocation 
and the desire to invest in a country. Selowsky and Martin (1997) explore the dynamics of the 
association between output and reforms (measured by the liberalisation index calculated by De 
Melo et al.) and the dynamic impact of these policy improvements on the flows of foreign direct 
investment (proxy for the desire to invest). Reforms have a statistically significant impact on 
                                                 
11 It could be found that the samples contain less than twenty-five countries due to the availability of the data. 
Mongolia, China and Vietnam can be sometimes included in the sample. 
12 Liberalisation of domestic prices and abolition of trading monopolies. 
13 Liberalisation of the foreign trade regime. 
14 Privatisation of small and large scale enterprises and banking reform.  
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growth and foreign assistance, but the shape of the response of output to policy is affected by the 
diversity of initial conditions (e.g. the countries in Central Europe compared with the former Soviet 
Union ones).  
Also the differing initial conditions have been recognized by researchers as forces explaining the 
growth pattern and included in the regression equations. De Melo, Denizer, Gelbe and Tenev (2001) 
and Staehr (2005) evaluate the interaction of initial conditions with other determinants. De Melo et 
al. study initial conditions, political change, and reforms in a unified framework covering twenty-
eight countries in East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. They 
identify variables to characterize the initial economic conditions of transition economies, initial 
macroeconomic distortions, and initial geopolitical characteristics. Economic policies are “proxied” 
by the economic liberalization index (originally developed in De Melo, Denizer and Gelb, 1996). 
Their regressions show that policy reform, economic liberalisation, depends on initial conditions, 
political change, and regional tensions. Economic performance, measured in terms of growth and 
inflation, depends on initial conditions, economic policies, and regional tensions. Adverse initial 
conditions are associated with slower economic liberalisation. Staehr include initial conditions 
among different explanatory variables in a panel consisting of annual data for twenty-five transition 
economies from 1989 to 2001. The independent variables are consumer price inflation, a war 
dummy, initial conditions (see De Melo et al. 2001), and variables to measure reform intensity, the 
EBRD indices, for which because of multicollinearity they use the principal components 
methodology. Early reforms in the form of liberalisation and small-scale privatisation have a 
positive medium term effect on growth even in the absence of other reforms. Liberalisation and 
small-scale privatisation have a positive effect on growth even if structural reforms are less 
advanced. A policy of large-scale privatisation and price liberalisation without small-scale 
privatisation and market opening has a negative impact on growth. Early market opening without 
other reforms like small-scale privatisation and enterprise restructuring also seems detrimental to 
growth, at least in the latter part of transition. Bank liberalisation without enterprise restructuring 
has a negative impact on growth, especially in the later stages of reform. Among initial conditions, 
the prior economic ones are significant and show a negative sign, while the initial macroeconomic 
distortions are insignificant. Later (2006), Young-Sun Lee and Hyung-Gon Jeong show that the 
effect of initial conditions that comprise socialist economic characteristics (repressed inflation, 
duration of planned economy, economic openness, CMEA trade dependency) and socialist 
economic performance (pre-reform income level and industrial distortion) is negative while the 
impact of economic reform on growth is positive. But the negative effect of initial conditions seems 
to override the positive impact of economic policies. 
The first general study of the role of institutions in transition economies is published in 2003. In this 
paper Havrylyshyn and Van Rooden update their previous regressions on panel data for the period 
1991-1998 to include institutional variables (from five different sources
15).  Their basic equation 
has the growth rate of real gross domestic product as dependent variable, and as independent 
variables the contemporaneous rate of inflation, to represent macroeconomic stabilisation policies, 
the contemporaneous and lagged values of the structural reform index (based on EBRD transition 
indicators), to represent economic liberalisation policies and their possible initial negative impact, 
two clusters of initial conditions (see De Melo et al. 2001), capturing macroeconomic distortions 
and the level of socialist development and its associated distortions. Their results show that 
macroeconomic policies and structural reforms are the two most important factors in explaining 
output developments. The inclusion of the institutional variables adds to the explanation of growth, 
although its contribution is small. Di Tommaso, Raiser, Weeks (2007) focus on the determinants of 
                                                 
15 The overall index of economic freedom, the sub indices of property rights and government regulation from the 
Heritage Foundation. The measures on democratic, economic freedom and the sub indices for rule of law and 
governance and public administration from the Freedom House. The legal reform index from the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. The average of responses given in a survey conducted by the World Bank in 1998. 
The political risk element of the ratings published by Euromoney.    
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institutional change, over the 1989-2002 period, determined by the ratings on governance and 
enterprise restructuring, competition policy, banking reform, interest rate liberalisation and 
securities markets and non banking financial institutions developed by EBRD. Their results say that 
small scale privatisation and economic liberalisation
16 are positively related to institutional change 
but only the latter variable is significant; that among the political variables, the Freedom House 
index
17 of political rights and civil liberties achieves significance; economic inequality is negatively 
associated with institutional change; neither the political turnover dummy nor the ethnic 
heterogeneity index are significant; the two dummies for religious affiliation
18 show opposite signs. 
Redek and Susjan (2005) use a concept of institutions developed by the Heritage Foundation. Their 
basic specification for twenty-four countries in the period 1995-2002 includes as regressors 
institutions, measured by the Heritage Foundation overall freedom index, investment, budget 
balance, inflation, inward FDI (foreign direct investment). The coefficient on the overall freedom 
index is positive and statistically significant even after some other variables are added. These other 
regressors include: dummies for war, initial GDP, and years under socialism as proxy for initial 
conditions, population growth rate, government consumption, unemployment rate and industrial 
production. For the same time horizon, Susjan and Redek (2008) develop a panel model of twenty-
two economies to show the relevance of the concept of uncertainty. They argue that uncertainty in 
the economic environment caused by institutional transformation as well as by some other transition 
specific factors has affected the performance of transition economies. To capture the dimensions of 
potential uncertainty, using the Heritage Foundation and Freedom House sub-indices, they build 
one new index and find that higher uncertainty index is associated with poor economic 
performance. They identify three main sources of growth: availability of growth factors (gross fixed 
capital per capita, share of secondary school enrolment), short run cyclical factors (inflation, 
unemployment, budget deficit), uncertainty (their index), other country specific variables (dummies 
for CEE and FSU). Uncertainty has an impact on economic performance, measured in terms of per 
capita GDP. 
Another dimension of institutions is studied by Pistor, Raiser, Gelfer (2000). They supplement the 
analysis of the laws on the books with an analysis of the effectiveness of legal institutions measured 
by three variables: rule of law, an index of effectiveness of corporate and bankruptcy law in 
transition economies constructed by the EBRD, and survey data on the ability of the legal system to 
protect private property rights and enforce contracts, which they call the enforcement index. The 
effectiveness of legal institutions has a much stronger impact on the propensity of firms to raise 
external finance than does the law on the books, despite legal change that has improved shareholder 
and creditor rights. Also Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) focus on the importance of the legal institutions 
and in particular on the political demand for the rule of law. By rule of law they mean well-defined 
and enforced property rights, broad access to those rights, and predictable rules, uniformly 
enforced, for resolving property rights disputes. By no rule of law they mean a legal regime that 
does not protect investors’ returns from confiscation by the state, does not protect minority 
shareholders’ rights from tunnelling, and does not enforce contract rights. In going from a command 
economy, where almost all property is owned by the state to a market economy, where individuals 
control their own property, an entirely new set of institutions would need to be established in a short 
period. This paper provides a model in which the economic actions and the political positions of 
individuals are interdependent. Individuals who control assets make both economic choices, to build 
value or strip assets, and political choices, by voting over policies that would establish the rule of 
law, and the equilibrium reached does or does not lead to the establishment of the rule of law.  
The last attempt to account for the role of institutions is by Beck and Laeven (2006). This paper is 
different from the previous ones because it looks for the determinants of institutional quality in a 
two stages approach. These determinants are identified with natural resources and the historical 
                                                 
16 Average of price liberalisation index and exchange rate liberalisation index (EBRD). 
17 Average Freedom House score for political rights and civil liberties. 
18 Western Christianity and Orthodox Christianity dummies.  
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experience of these countries during socialism. They focus on a broad indicator of institutional 
development, the Kaufman Kraay and Mastruzzi (KKM) indicators of voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, control of corruption and political 
stability. Their main variable, institutional development is the average of these six variables. To 
capture the historic experience of transition economies during the socialist period and thus the 
entrenchment of the socialist elite at the start of the transition period, they use the number of years a 
country has spent under socialism
19. In the first stage of their cross-country model, they regress 
institution building on initial raw exports and years under socialism. Institution building is 
institutional development (average of six principal component indicators voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, absence of corruption, and political 
stability), change in rule of law, change in control of corruption, EBRD reform index (average of 
reforms in the areas of enterprise reforms, competition policy, banking sector reform, and reform of 
non-banking financial institutions). Years under socialism and initial raw exports enter negatively 
and are statistically significant. The second stage relates the exogenous component of institutional 
development, explained by natural resource dominance and socialist entrenchment, to GDP per 
capita growth over the period 1992-2004, and shows a positive and significant relationship.  
All the papers surveyed look at institutions in very different ways and it should be clearer now why 
at the beginning we talked about “a broad concept” of institutions. Institutions can be read as the 
degree of economic freedom, the degree of democratic freedom, the extent of property rights and 
government regulation, of voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, 
regulatory quality, control of corruption, political stability, and as specific indicators more related to 
the economic reforms and transformation of these countries. The models cover all the transition 
economies, without distinction between Central Eastern European countries and former Soviet ones, 
may be cross-sectional with a noteworthy “sacrifice” in terms of number of observations and may 
be static with very few exceptions.  
The characteristics mostly thought as peculiar to countries in transit are corruption, the presence of 
an unofficial economy and the integration into the world economy due to the membership of these 
countries in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).  
Goel and Budak (2006) study the effects of government size and country size as dimensions of 
determinants of corruption for twenty-five transition economies over the period 1998-2002. The 
size of government can be a deterrent or an inducement to corruption. If a larger government 
spending entails greater deterrence and enforcement measures, it might lead to lower corruption. 
But a larger government might signify greater red tape and is likely to result in greater corruption. 
Country size is captured by the land area. Other things being equal, a larger country has greater 
difficulty in policing and monitoring its government officials. They regress corruption, measured by 
the corruption perceptions index from Transparency International, on the Human Development 
Index, the government expenditure, the land area, the index of transition (EBRD), and a soviet 
dummy. Greater degree of economic prosperity in a country lowers corruption in all cases, 
suggesting that as transition nations become wealthier, the level of corruption goes down. A bigger 
government size seems to reduce corruption in transition countries. It may be that, instead of 
increasing bureaucratic red tape, government spending in the transition years was aimed at 
strengthening the monitoring and policing mechanisms. A country’s physical area or geographic 
area is significant in terms of its impact on corruption suggesting that other things being equal, 
more spread out countries would have a harder time controlling corruption. The magnitude of the 
effect of area on corruption seems rather modest. The overall index of transition progress suggests 
that comprehensive transition reforms contribute to lower levels of corruption in these countries. 
They also find that comprehensive reforms might work best at corruption reduction than piecemeal 
reforms.  
                                                 
19 As alternative indicator of entrenchment they use Executive Constraints 1930, which measures on a scale from one to 
seven the de facto political independence of a country’s chief executive in 1930.  
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Another characteristic often associated with countries in transit is the presence of an unofficial 
economy. Johnson, Kaufmann, Shleifer (1997) think that the size of the unofficial economy is a 
consequence of politicisation. When profits or potential profits are taken away from firms through 
regulation, taxation, or corruption, entrepreneurs choose not to start firms or expand less rapidly 
than they might otherwise. But entrepreneurs can choose to operate unofficially. The movement of 
production into the unofficial economy has significant consequences for public finance. Since firms 
in the unofficial sector largely escape taxation, the reallocation of resources into that sector 
undermines tax collections, and consequently the ability of the government to provide public goods 
in the official sector. Such public goods include law and order, effective tax and regulatory 
institutions, and relatively incorrupt public administration. The lack of provision of such market-
supporting public goods makes operating in the official sector even less attractive to firms, and can 
set off the collapse of public finances as more and more firms escape into the unofficial economy. 
Economies find themselves in either of two very different equilibria. In the first, tax distortions and 
regulations are low, government revenues are high, the provision of public goods in the official 
sector is sufficient and therefore the unofficial sector is small. This is the case for the countries 
concentrated in Easter Europe. In the second equilibrium, if in the official sector taxes and 
regulations are prohibitive, public finances are precarious, public goods provision is inadequate, and 
as a consequence, much of the economic activity is concentrated in the unofficial sector. This is the 
case for the former Soviet Union ones. If firms are more productive in the official than in the 
unofficial sector, the second equilibrium is associated with worse aggregate performance than the 
first. The key prediction of their model is the potential separation of economies into two distinct 
groups. In one, the government offers a sufficiently attractive combination of tax rates, regulations, 
and public goods that most firms choose to stay in the official sector. In this group, government 
revenues suffice to provide the public goods, and the unofficial sector is small because the 
government competes against it. In the other group, the government does not offer firms a 
sufficiently attractive combination of tax rates, regulations, and public goods to keep them 
operating officially, and hence many of them end up in the large unofficial sector, which offers a 
more attractive combination. The government budget in these countries does not suffice to offer 
more public goods, and hence the unofficial sector wins the competition for firms. Their model 
suggests that in economies where firms are free to move between the official and unofficial sectors, 
transition is likely to follow one of two paths. Some countries would be characterized by low 
burdens from taxes, regulation, and corruption; relatively high tax revenues; large quantities of 
public goods provided by the government; small unofficial sectors; and if the official sector is more 
efficient high growth rates. Other countries would be characterized by high burdens from taxes, 
regulation, and corruption: low tax collections; small quantities of public goods provided by the 
government; large unofficial sectors; and presumably, low growth rates.  
Barlow’s paper (2006) focuses upon the importance of trade reform and studies its role in a 
dynamic panel model for twenty-one transition economies. The measure of openness of an economy 
used is indices of the policy stance. All data are taken from the transition report produced by the 
EBRD. They use indices for trade reform, privatisation and internal market supporting policies. The 
internal market index is calculated as the arithmetic average of the indices of restructuring and 
corporate governance, banking and competition policy. The privatisation index is the weighted 
average of the indices of large scale and small-scale privatisation. The trade reform index is the 
EBRD’s transition scores for foreign exchange and trade liberalisation. The dependent variable is 
the growth rate of GDP, the independent variables the index of trade policy, the privatisation index, 
the index of internal market reforms, the percentage rate of inflation. For the specification over the 
full sample with year dummies, trade policy has a significantly positive effect in both the level and 
difference. Internal market reforms have a statistically significant negative effect and privatisation 
has insignificantly negative effect. The results show the importance for trade reform as a 
determinant of GDP growth but the effect is clearer for the early transition and the Western group. 
For the Eastern group trade reform only becomes a significant determinant of growth in the  
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presence of interaction terms, maybe because of the fact that Eastern countries rely on natural 
resources or agriculture or both. In early transition, trade reforms raise growth and privatisation 
seems to have little influence. In the later period, it is privatisation that raises growth. One potential 
reason the coefficients cannot be trusted is the co-linearity among the indices used. 
The literature has succeeded in establishing the importance of initial conditions and reforms. Also 
the role of the various indicators chosen as institutions has been shown.  
However, a number of issues remains open. Due to the problems of definition pointed out before, it 
happens that some indicators are used both as reform measures and as institutional measures; more 
work should be devoted to discern among the available variables. It often happens that the 
reasoning underlying their usage as well as the needed documentation on the construction of the 
indices used are not disclosed. The role of economic policy has been marginally considered and it 
should be explained its meaning and position with respect to institutions and reforms for the case of 
transition economies. Moreover, despite the presence of Soviet dummy and of different set of initial 
conditions, all this literature doesn’t make any formal distinction between Central and Eastern 
European countries and Former Soviet Union ones. More emphasis should be placed upon the 
historical perspective, which may help out with finding conceptually a new key for the meaning of 
reforms, institutions, and economic policy. From an empirical point of view, in order to study the 
path of growth and the forces that shape it, efforts that attempt to put forward dynamic approaches 
are needed and longer time horizons should be observed.  
 
 
4. Definition and Measure of Institutions 
 
After the collapse of a specific typology of economic institutions, new institutions, as already 
emphasized, had to be established. To understand which measure of institutions were more 
coherent, we concentrated on the features that have “branded” the Soviet economic system: fixed 
prices and wages, trade carried out by centralized organizations, all property belonged to the state, 
and a mono-bank system, whereby a single state bank functioned as a country’s central bank as well 
as a nationwide commercial and investment bank.  
At the beginning of the 1990’s, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan 
needed, following our reasoning, a set of institutions, that allowed them to get on to a market 
economy. Before we called these institutions, institutions necessary for a market economy. Indeed, 
in a market economy, prices and wages are not controlled, private property is not forbidden, trade is 
free, to a certain extent enterprises compete, there are independent banks and non-banking 
intermediaries, and all this, of course, is accompanied by an “appropriate” regulatory infrastructure. 
For this reason, the eight EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) indices of 
small and large-scale privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, 
trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate 
liberalisation, securities market and non bank financial institutions, serve our purpose. These 
indices are concretely related to the economic structure because they assess whether private 
ownership, market prices, a financial discipline at enterprise level, a clear foreign exchange regime, 
a free trade, a developed financial system, and an effective unrestricted entry to the markets and 
enforcement of competition policy, are present. In this sense, they are economic institutions, and 
their values not only measure the degree of development reached in a particular year but also, in last 
instance, allow us to think of the quality of the economic policies behind them.  
The fact that data on institutions could not be based on objective criteria is often debated. However, 
although rationally a certain degree of judgement, on the part of the various sources, should be 
taken into account, what really matters and has to be checked is the existence of a methodological 
coherence through countries and years.  
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The E.B.R.D. grades, on a scale of 1 to 4+ (4.33), each country in a given year along these eight 
dimensions
20. Because the institutional indices are highly correlated
21, our measure of economic 
institutions is a composite index. For each country, we sum the value of each indicator in one year 
and normalize the aggregate index obtained, so that it ranges from 0
22 to 1. This procedure, known 
in literature
23, gives an immediate sense of the level of these economic institutions, with 0 meaning 
persistence of the characteristics of the former Soviet economic system and 1 suggesting standards 
of the more advanced market economies. 
Figure 2 presents the values of the economic institutions index for the former Soviet Union 
economies in selected years. Countries with low values of the index have low quality institutions, 
more similar to the Soviet system; countries with high values of the index have better institutions. If 
we look at the 1991 values, the starting point values, among the economies with high institutions 
index are Estonia (the highest), Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia (the lowest).  Among  the   economies  
 































Figure 2: Economic Institutions Index for selected years 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
with low values, all the others. After some years, in 1999 and 2008, all the countries have moved 
away from their lowest level, but only a few of them have made substantial progress in reaching 
advanced standards. These are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania with values appreciably greater than 0.85. 
Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine show values around 0.7. 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan stand among those with lower values of the index 
(less than 0.63).  
 
 
                                                 
20 EBRD methodology is shown in Appendix B. 
21 See Appendix A. 
22 The minimum value is 0.2309468822. 
23 See for instance Hall and Jones (1998).  
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4. Econometric Analysis 
 
In this section, we empirically investigate the importance of economic institutions for the pattern of 
economic growth. The analysis takes into account eighteen years, from 1991 to 2008, and fifteen 
countries. Economic institutions, as said in the previous section, are estimated by a composite index 
built from the EBRD indicators, while the economic performance is measured by GDP. Purchasing 
power parity per capita GDP (constant 2005 international $) values are taken from the World 
Development Indicators database. 
However, before starting with an in-depth econometric analysis, let us first proceed with a graphical 
examination in order to have a better understanding of the path of the economic performance of 
these countries. 
The next graph (Figure 3) shows the path of the values of GDP, expressed in logarithmic terms. In 
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Figure 3: Pattern of Economic Performance in FSU countries (1991-2008) 
 
This fall for some of them lasts till 1996, for  some others until 2000. Among the first group there 
are Armenia (1994), Azerbaijan  (1996), Belarus (1996), Estonia  (1994), Georgia  (1995), 
Kazakhstan  (1996), Kyrgyzstan  (1996), Latvia (1994), Lithuania (1995). Among the second, 
Moldova (2000), Russia (1997), Tajikistan (1998), Turkmenistan (1998), Ukraine (1999), 
Uzbekistan (1997). The reasons underlying this fall can be found in the “feeling” of confusion, 
uncertainty, and disruption that followed the breakdown. Numerous economic relationships, 
enforced by the coercive power of the central planner, didn’t exist anymore.  
Referring to the all time horizon, three points stand out. The first one, maybe more “expected”, is 
that we can distinguish among countries looking at their GDP values starting from 2004. Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia, show values (in logarithmic terms) greater than 9; Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine show values between 9 and 8; 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan values smaller than 8. Second, they all have had low 
growth rates since the “recovery”. Third, there is path dependence. The series show a clear  
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persistence; a sort of  “brake”, “anchor”, with respect of the previous values. This evidence suggests 
that a dynamic approach is unavoidable. Lastly, to see the world “position” of these countries, the 
series for the OECD countries and the low and middle income ones are added. While the distance 
between the former and the most “prosperous” FSU countries is appreciable, that between the 
others and the low income ones is not significant. Indeed, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan are classified either as lower 
middle income or as low income countries.
24    
Since our goal is to evaluate the significance of the index of economic institutions for these 
countries from the breakdown, to establish whether there is any relationship, we perform a simple 









10 ln GDP per capita P.P.P.
.2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Economic Institutions Index
 
Figure 4. Scatterplot: GDP and Index of Economic Institutions 
 
Although the pattern is clear, this approach is just illustrative and it suffers from several problems. 
Therefore, to get a more trustworthy picture of this relationship and to see how much of the 
economic paths of these countries is explained by this specific set of institutions, panel data analysis 
is needed.  
 
4.1The Static Model 
The relationship between the index of economic institutions and per capita GDP is first studied via a 
static approach. For estimation, the sample consists of the fifteen Former Soviet Union countries 
observed for the period 1991-2008. Our specification sees purchasing power parity per capita GDP 
as the dependent variable and the index of economic institutions as the independent one.  
Because of the complexity of our task, we decide not to opt immediately for one estimator and 
hence a specific value for the coefficient of the index of economic institutions. Rather, to estimate 
the impact of institutions on per capita GDP, we employ different estimation techniques. Our goal is 
to study the values taken on by the coefficient of our index, according to the estimation methods 
                                                 
24 Source: Word Development Indicators Database.  
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employed, and check whether the econometric results and, more generally, our specification are 
coherent. 
We estimate ordinary least squares, robust ordinary least squares, generalized least squares, and 
two-way fixed effects regressions. Because the number of periods is reasonable (eighteen years), we 
create a set of time indicator variables
25 and test for their joined significance. Since the result
26 
confirms their importance, time dummies are included in all the estimated regressions, eliminating 
in this way the bias arising from omitted variables that change over time but are the same across 
countries. 
Table 1. Static specification: OLS and robust OLS regressions 
  O.L.S. estimator  robust O.L.S. estimator 
 Dependent  variable:  ln GDP p.c. PPP Dependent  variable:  ln GDP p.c. PPP 
  Coefficient Std.  Error  t  coefficient  Robust      
Std. Error  t 
Ecinst   2.591427
***  .3060928       8.47   2.591427
***   .320644  8.08 
yr1991   .8528157
***  .2796604        3.05   .8528157
***  .2863529 2.98 
yr1992       .3586713
ns  .2669237        1.34       .3586713
ns  .2755491 1.30 
yr1993       .0552961
ns  .2593582        0.21       .0552961
ns  .2561929 0.22 
yr1994      -.2370729
ns  .2540171      - 0.9      -.2370729
ns    .261407        -0.91 
yr1995        -.575487
**  .2471853     -2.33         -.4889738
*  .2555338 -1.91 
yr1996        -.575487
**  .2471853     -2.33           -.575487
**    .252802  -2.28 
yr1997      -.5858141
**  .2464952     -2.38      -.5858141
**  .2519804 -2.32 
yr1998      -.5516772
**  .2465137     -2.24      -.5516772
**  .2637011 -2.09 
yr1999        -.519397
**  .2464756     -2.11           -.519397
**  .2642097 -1.97 
yr2000      -.4748083
*  .2462068     -1.93      -.4748083
*  .2653722 -1.79 
yr2001      -.4260136
*  .2459166     -1.73      -.4260136
ns  .2644729 -1.61 
yr2002        -.393655
ns  .2456303     -1.60        -.393655
ns  .2615521 -1.51 
yr2003      -.3217466
ns  .2455377     -1.31      -.3217466
ns    .259823  -1.24 
yr2004      -.2495684
ns  .2454606     -1.02      -.2495684
ns  .2629304 -0.95 
yr2005      -.1909303
ns  .2453656     -0.78      -.1909303
ns  .2665882 -0.72 
yr2006      -.1081765
ns  .2453366     -0.44      -.1081765
ns  .2691487 -0.40 
yr2007      -.0274037
ns  .2453197     -0.11      -.0274037
ns  .2708409 -0.10 
constant       7.018683
***  .2716897           25.83   7.018683
***  .3027604        23.18 
       N = 270  N = 270 
  F (18, 251) = 6.39 (Prob>F = 0.0000)  F(18, 251) = 7.37 (Prob>F = 0.0000) 
  R-squared = 0.3142  R-squared = 0.3142 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms. 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Superscript  
ns the absence of significance.  
Time dummies are included. 
 
Our strategy is to start from the basic and simplest estimator, the OLS one, and little by little to 
introduce additional complexities. This “regression order” is not casual: it is demanded by the 
particular structure of our panel dataset and by its statistical “flaws”. 
Indeed, the assumptions of cross-sectional independence, homoskedasticity, and no serial 
correlation in the idiosyncratic errors are violated. Both the Pesaran test
27 and Friedman test
28 reject 
the assumption that the error terms are independent across cross-sections; a Wald test
29 rejects the 
                                                 
25 Once time effects are generated, they are transformed into centred indicators by subtracting the indicator for the 
excluded class from each of the other indicator variables. This transformation (see C. F. Baum 2006) expresses the time 
effects as variations from the conditional mean of the sample rather than deviations from the excluded class (2008). 
26 F(17, 237) = 44.28, Pr= 0.0000 
 
27 The Pesaran’s statistic follows a standard normal distribution. Pesaran's test = 34.437, Pr = 0.000. 
28 The Friedman test uses Friedman's chi-square distributed statistic. Friedman's test = 206.294, Pr = 0.0000 
29 Chi2(15)=133.40, Pr=0.0000  
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assumption that the error variances are not specific to cross sectional units; and the Wooldridge
30 
test rejects the null of no first-order autocorrelation
31.  
The results of the OLS and robust OLS regressions are shown in Table 1. The first column lists the 
regressors, that is, our index ecinst, the year dummies and the usual constant term. The first row 
highlights the estimation strategy employed; the second row, the dependent variable; the third, the 
estimated coefficients, their standard errors and the t statistic. At the bottom, the number of 
observations, the F test and a measure of fit are displayed. The OLS estimate of the coefficient of 
the index of economic institutions, ecinst, shows a positive and highly statistically significant effect 
on the dependent variable. The same happens when we use the Huber-White sandwich estimator 
and obtain standard errors robust to conditionally heteroskedasticity. The GLS regression results 
can be seen in Table 2. Being aware of the violated assumptions and the results of the tests, we  
 
Table 2. Static Specification: Two-way fixed effects and GLS regressions 
  G.L.S. estimator  Two-way fixed effects 
estimator 
 Dependent  variable:  ln GDP p.c P.P.P. Dependent  variable:  ln GDP p.c. P.P.P. 
  Coefficient  Std. 
Error  t Coefficient  Std.  
Error  T 
Ecinst  .1276254
***  .0364279     3.50     .5041996
***    .1831759                2.75 
yr1991    -.3011713
***  .0167966  -17.93        -.062897
ns  .0985398          -0.64 
yr1992    -.5578467
***  .0133562  -41.77      -.3588432
***  .0849528          -4.22 
yr1993    -.6890479
***  .0109436  -62.96      -.5188923
***  .0760992          -6.82 
yr1994    -.8329875
***  .0088518  -94.10      -.6867346
***  .0693478          -9.90 
yr1995    -.8779468
***  .0056481        -155.44      -.7658246
***  .0619851        -12.35 
yr1996    -.8790633
***  .0043535        -201.92      -.7828037
***    .059857        -13.08 
yr1997    -.8353863
***  .0035745        -233.71      -.7505508
***         .058829        -12.76 
yr1998    -.7991389
***  .0035696        -223.87      -.7176993
***       .0588568        -12.19 
yr1999    -.7592237
***  .0035074        -216.46      -.6827679
***       .0587996        -11.61 
yr2000    -.6867112
***  .0030962        -221.79      -.6180943
***       .0583948        -10.58 
yr2001    -.6034978
***    .002574        -234.46      -.543872
***       .0579553          -9.38 
yr2002       -.5281
***       .0019372        -272.60      -.4793775
***       .0575189          -8.33 
yr2003    -.4353828
***  .0016387        -265.70      -.3940926
***       .0573772          -6.87 
yr2004    -.3423423
***       .0013527        -253.08      -.3084976
***       .0572589          -5.39 
yr2005    -.2516679
***       .0008748        -287.70      -.2270431
***       .0571128          -3.98 
yr2006    -.1507282
***       .0006148        -245.18      -.1335237
**       .0570682          -2.34 
yr2007    -.0532458
***       .0003724        -142.98      -.0434315
ns       .0570422          -0.76 
constant     8.914367
***       .0258778         344.48      8.444594
***       .1314746         64.23 
              N = 270  N = 270 
     Wald chi2(18)=8531049(Prob >chi2  =0.0000) F(18, 237) = 44.95 (Prob >F=0.0000) 
           -  within R-squared = 0.7735 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms. 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Superscript 
ns absence of significance. 
Time dummies are included. 
 
estimate specifying heteroskedastic error structure with cross-sectional correlation and within 
panels specific AR(1) correlation. This estimation strategy, explicitly handling those “flaws”, still 
shows a positive and significant (less significant than previous cases of Table 1) impact of our index 
on per capita GDP.  
Although time dummies have been included as explanatory variables, the model could suffer from 
omitted variables bias. Because we are dealing with a close set (namely, a set of countries), our a 
priori knowledge suggests we might allow for an intercept coefficient that varies both by unit and 
                                                 
30 Wooldridge, J. M. (2002).  Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
31 F(1,14) = 291.734, Pr= 0.0000  
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by time, thus controlling the bias that arises both from unobserved variables that are constant over 
time and from unobserved variables that are constant across countries. To see if our propensity for 
the fixed effects specification is reasonable according to the data, we implement the Hausman test, 
whose result, as expected, is the rejection of the null hypothesis
32: the country-level effects appear 
to be correlated with the regressors. Therefore, our specification becomes: 
  
t i t i t i t i ecinst gdppcppp , , , ε + ψ + ϕ + β + α =                                                                            (1) 
where  t i, ε are the idiosyncratic errors, while  i ϕ  and  t ψ  captures the country fixed effects and the 
time effects, respectively.  
 
Tabella 3. Static Specification: 
Two-way fixed effects regression with Driscoll-Kraay covariance estimator 
Two-way fixed effects estimator with Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors 








[95% Conf. Interval] 
 
Ecinst    .5041996     .0876637            5.75     0.000       .3161797      .6922194 
yr1991    -.062897      .03846     -1.64  0.124      -.1453855          .0195914 
yr1992  -.3588432     .0301356       -11.91     0.000      -.4234777         -.2942087 
yr1993  -.5188923     .0241159       -21.52     0.000      -.5706158         -.4671687 
yr1994  -.6867346     .0188858       -36.36  0.000      -.7272407         -.6462286 
yr1995  -.7658246     .0116277       -65.86     0.000      -.7907637         -.7408856 
yr1996  -.7828037     .0087073       -89.90     0.000      -.8014791         -.7641284 
yr1997  -.7505508  .0069189  -108.48  0.000      -.7653905         -.7357111 
yr1998  -.7176993     .0069729    -102.93     0.000      -.7326548         -.7027439 
yr1999  -.6827679     .0068616              -99.51       0.000      -.6974846         -.6680513 
yr2000  -.6180943        .006018     -102.71     0.000      -.6310017         -.6051869 
yr2001    -.543872     .0049501     -109.87     0.000      -.5544889         -.5332552 
yr2002  -.4793775  .0036004  -133.15  0.000      -.4870995         -.4716556 
yr2003  -.3940926     .0030385    -129.70  0.000      -.4006096         -.3875756 
yr2004  -.3084976        .002475     -124.64     0.000                -.313806         -.3031892 
yr2005  -.2270431     .0015167     -149.69     0.000       -.2302961             -.22379 
yr2006  -.1335237     .0010646         -125.42     0.000         -.135807          -.1312404 
yr2007  -.0434315     .0006732              -64.52     0.000      -.0448753         -.0419877 
constant    8.444594     .0598883       141.01     0.000        8.316146           8.573041 
N = 270 
F(18, 14) = 33.08  (Prob > F = 0.0000) 
within R-squared = 0.7735 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms.  
 
Given the incontrovertible significance of the individual effects
33 (and of the time dummies, as seen 
before), we estimate the two-way fixed effects regression for (1). The estimates are displayed in 
Table 2, where the index ecinst, another time, exhibits a positive and statistically significant impact 
on the path of economic performance. But even if we have eliminated the bias by introducing 
country and time dummies, the serious problem is that these estimates (the ones in table 2) are not 
completely reliable because of the flaws of the error structure. Driscoll and Kraay
34 (1998) have 
developed a covariance estimator that allows to consider an error structure heteroskedastic, 
                                                 
32 chi2(1) = 10.53, Prob>chi2 = 0.0012 
33 F test that all φi =0:  F(14, 237) =   314.85, Prob > F = 0.0000  
34  Driscoll, John C. and Aart C. Kraay (1998), Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Spatially Dependent 
Panel Data, Review of Economics and Statistics 80, 549-560.  
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autocorrelated (up to some lag), and correlated between the panels. The estimates obtained by 
employing this method are given in Table 3: the standard errors now are robust to forms of cross-
sectional ("spatial") and temporal dependence. The effect of ecinst on per capita GDP is 0.5041996: 
the variable of interest is confirmed to be statistically significant and affect positively the path of 
economic growth. 
Our hypothesis, that the “state” of economic institutions affects the economic outcomes, is proved: 
economic institutions have an annual impact on the level of per capita GDP. The methodology 
followed testifies that the static specification is on the whole coherent. It also allows to study the 
behaviour of the coefficient associated with ecinst and the values it takes on according to the 
different estimators used. The first two strategies, the OLS and GLS ones, assess a maximum and a 
minimum value, 2.591427 and 0.1276254 respectively, that can be thought as benchmarks. The 
robust two-way within estimator, eliminating the sources of bias and considering the features of the 
error structure, is able to “locate” it between them. That’s the reason, the coefficient estimated, 
0.5041996, properly quantifies the impact of institutions. 
  
4.2The Dynamic Specification 
An evidence the static specification does not consider is the persistence of the GDP values, as 
revealed by the patterns shown in Figure 3. This persistence, called path-dependence, means that 
history matters and calls for a dynamic approach.  
The first task faced in developing a dynamic model is the choice of the lags of the dependent 
variable, about which we estimate robust OLS regressions for: 
 
t i s t i t i gdppcPPP gdppcppp , , , ε + β + α = −    with i = 1,…,15; t = 1991,…, 2008; s = 1, 2, 3.       (3) 
 
Table 4. AR(1), AR(2), AR(3) Models 
  OLS Robust Estimator 
  Dependent Variable: Ln GDP p.c. PPP 




  (.0074255)  (.0560543)  (.1331366) 
  (136.31) (28.31)  (11.79) 
Ln GDP p.c. PPPt-2    -.5903984
***  -.4868536
** 
   (.0564441)  (.241396) 
   (-10.46) (-2.02) 
Ln GDP p.c. PPPt-3     -.0882809
ns 
    (.1156588) 





  (.0622867)  (.035985 )  (.0320953) 
  (-1.34) (1.51)  (2.21) 
N 255 240  225 
R-squared 0.9780  0.9944  0.9955 
F test  F(1, 253)= 18580.05 
(Prob > F = 0.0000) 
F(2, 237)= 27590.18  
(Prob > F =  0.0000) 
F(3, 221)= 22516.00 
(Prob > F = 0.0000) 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms. 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Superscript 
ns absence of significance. 
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Looking at the results in Table 4, where per capita GDP is regressed on its past values, the 
magnitude and the significance of the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable establish the 
AR(2) model as our benchmark. Usually, an AR(1) model is supposed to have a coefficient 
associated with the lagged dependent variable smaller than one. The particular structure of our 
panel dataset, instead, requires to include two lags, to reduce the temporal persistence. In particular, 
it is worth noting that the overall dynamic effect is less than one.  
Having determined the number of lags, in order to quantify the importance of institutions for the 
economic paths of the Former Soviet Union economies, we methodologically follow a strategy 
similar to the one before. We estimate robust OLS, robust one-way Fixed Effects and Arellano-
Bond GMM  regressions for: 
 
t i i t i 2 t i 1 t i t i ecinst gdppcppp gdppcppp gdppcppp , , , , , ε + ϕ + δ + γ + β + α = − −                        (3) 
 
where  i ϕ  are the country specific fixed effects and i = 1,…15; t = 1991,…,2008. 
 
Table 5. Dynamic Specification: Robust O.L.S. and Robust LSDV Regressions 
  O.L.S. Robust Estimator  One-way Fixed Effects Robust 
Estimator 
 Dependent  variable:  Ln GDP p.c. PPP Dependent  variable:  Ln GDP p.c. PPP
  coefficient  Robust     
Std. Error  t coefficient  Robust      
Std. Error  t 
LnGDPp.c.PPPt-1  1.551684
***  .0571826 27.14 1.401749
***  .1204193 11.64 
LnGDPp.c.PPPt-2  -.5609012
***  .0568499 -9.87  -.4620541
***  .1155239 -4.00 
Ecinst  .0700338
**  .030883 2.27 .3043575
**  .122829 2.48 
constant  .0584146
ns  .0362379 1.61 .3386539
***  .093506 3.62 
  N = 240  N = 240 
  F(3, 236) =18176.88  (Prob > F = 0.0000)  F(3, 14) =2678.94 (Prob > F = 0.0000) 
  R-squared = 0.9946  within R-squared = 0.9685 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms. 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Superscript 
ns absence of significance. 
 
The regression results with the simple robust OLS and LSDV estimators are shown above. 
Theoretically, with dynamic panel data model, these estimators are acknowledged to give seriously 
biased estimates for the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable. Precisely, the OLS estimator 
gives upwardly biased estimates; the FE estimator downwardly biased ones. Consequently, the 
“true” overall dynamic effect (namely, the sum of the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable) 
should lie between the OLS and FE estimates, between 0.9907829 and 0.9396949 respectively. 
Furthermore, Table 5 allows to study the behaviour of the coefficient of the variable ecinst: 
economic institutions affect positively per capita GDP and are significant at five percent level, 
according to both regressions. 
Econometrically, the dynamic specification is made especially needed by the presence of 
autocorrelation, strongly documented by the OLS AR(1) model (Table 4). However, the bias in the 
estimates above requires the adoption of a GMM estimator that should succeed in “placing” the 
overall dynamic effect in a halfway point and giving a reliable estimate of the impact of the index of 
institutions on GDP. As equation (3) points out, time dummies are not included. Because the 
majority of them loses the significance taken in the static case and the temporal-dynamic feature of  
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the data may be well “captured” by the Arellano Bond estimator
35, that specification was 
implemented.  
The Arellano-Bond GMM regression results are displayed in Table 6. Because of the dimensional 
structure of the dataset, the so-called one-step estimator is used
36. Economic institutions are highly 
statistically significant (at one percent significance level) and still affect positively the economic 
outcomes. The sum
37 of the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable, 0.9631546, 
follows the rule to be smaller than the OLS estimate and bigger than the FE one. On the whole, the 
dynamic effects are well pictured.  
The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null of the validity of instruments.   
   
Table 6. Dynamic Specification: the GMM-Difference Estimator 
  Arellano Bond one-step Estimator 
  Dependent variable: ln GDP p.c. PPP 
  coefficient Std.  Error  t  P>|t| [95%  Conf.  Interval] 
LnGDPp.c.PPPt-1  1.397501  .0490924  28.47  0.000  1.301282     1.49372 
LnGDPp.c.PPPt-2  -.4343464  .0468237  -9.28  0.000  -.5261192   -.3425736 
Ecinst  .3272842  .0722469  4.53  0.000  .1856829    .4688855 
constant  .1318742  .1141592  1.16  0.248  -.0918737    .3556222 
  Number of observations = 225 
  Number of instruments = 136 
  Wald chi2 (3) = 7312.34 (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
  Sargan test: chi2(132) = 125.076 (Prob > chi2 = 0.6527) 
 
Arellano-Bond test: 
Order1  z = -6.4612  (Prob > z = 0.0000) 
Order2  z =  1.3614  (Prob > z = 0.1734) 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms.  
Wald tests the null that the intercept is the only determinant of growth. 
 
Also the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order autocorrelation in the first-differenced 
errors
38 is good: the test statistic presents strong evidence against the null hypothesis of zero 
autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors at order 1 and no evidence of serial correlation in the 
first-differenced errors at order 2.   
Moreover, to avoid the problem of biased estimates, caused by the correlation among lagged 
dependent variable and individual errors, once the number of instruments increases relative to the 
number of observations, we restrict the number
39 of lags of the dependent variable to use as 
instruments. These new estimates are shown in Table 7. The Sargan overidentification test, that is 
proved to over-reject in presence of heteroskedasticity, suggests that our strategy is valid and the 
                                                 
35 Arellano, M., and S. Bond  (199), Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an 
application to employment  equations, Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277-297. 
36 The two-step one, in this case, is not reliable because, by downsizing the standard errors, it would make the 
regressors more significant.  
37 This sum is smaller than one, as it should be. 
38 When the idiosyncratic errors are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), the first-differenced errors are 
first-order serially correlated. Serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at an order higher than one implies the the 
moment conditions used are not valid. 
39 Differenced Sargan tests have been implemented to this regard.  
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same goes for the Arellano Bond test. The overall dynamic effect is correctly assessed: the sum of 
the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable, 0.964423, follows the empirical rule 
already explained. The economic institutions, from a dynamic point of view, keep on playing a key 
role: ecinst is statistically significant (at one percent significance level) and affects positively the 
economic paths. 
Thus, also this dynamic approach, justified theoretically by the presence of path-dependence and 
econometrically by the structure of the data, corroborates our hypothesis and turns out to be a 
necessary and crucial tool in understanding the economic fortunes of the FSU countries. 
To be more precise, the economic institutions index encompasses eight dimensions: large and small 
scale privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring, competition policy, price liberalisation, 
foreign exchange and trade liberalisation, banking and non banking reforms. Following E.B.R.D. 
reports, we subdivide our main index in four sub-indices: privatisation (including large and small 
scale privatisation indicators), enterprise (including governance and enterprise restructuring, and 
competition policy indicators), liberalisation (including price liberalisation and, trade and foreign 
 
Table 7. Dynamic Specification: the GMM Difference Estimator with limited instruments 
  Arellano Bond Dynamic Estimator 
  Dependent variable: ln GDP p.c. PPP 
  coefficient Std.  Error  t  P>|t| [95%  Conf.  Interval] 
LnGDPp.c.PPPt-1  1.368678  .0508154  26.93  0.000  1.269082    1.468275 
LnGDPp.c.PPPt-2  -.404255  .0483564  -8.36  0.000  -.4990318   -.3094783 
Ecinst  .3912972  .0743789  5.26  0.000  .2455172    .5370772 
constant  .08304  .1141326  0.73  0.467  -.1406559    .3067358 
  Number of observations = 225 
  Number of instruments = 92 
  Wald chi2 (3) =7282.37 (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
  Sargan test: chi2(88) = 102.9093 (Prob > chi2 = 0.1323) 
 
Arellano-Bond test: 
Order1  z = -6.2885   (Prob > z = 0.0000) 
Order2   z =  1.2609   (Prob > z = 0.2074) 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms.  
Wald tests the null that the intercept is the only determinant of growth. 
 
system indicators) and financing (including baking reforms and non-banking financial 
intermediaries reforms indicators).  
As before, the grades for each FSU countries in the years studied are summed and the amount 
obtained normalized, in order to have sub-indexes that range from 0







                                                 
40 The minimum value is 0.2309468822.  
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We restrict the number of lags of the dependent variable used as instruments, guided by the Sargan 
and Differenced Sargan tests, and estimate Arellano-Bond GMM regressions for: 
 
t i i t i 2 t i 1 t i t i gdppcppp gdppcppp gdppcppp , , , , , ε + ϕ + Θ δ + γ + β + α = − −                                 (4) 
 
where Θ can alternatively be one of the four sub-indices,  i ϕ are the country specific fixed effects 
and i = 1,…15; t = 1991,…,2008. 
The regression results are presented below. The sum of the coefficients of the lagged dependent 
variable is smaller than one in each model, as it should be, and the sub-indices, individually, are 
highly significant and affect positively the levels of per capita GDP. The output of the Sargan test 
for each model does not reject the null of the validity of the instruments and also the Arellano-Bond  
tests give the expected results. On the whole, this validates our estimation strategy. 
 
Tabella 8. Dynamic Specification: the GMM Difference Estimator with limited instruments  
  Arellano Bond Dynamic Estimator 












  (.0534041) (.0423482)  (.042988)  (.0436143) 
Privatisation  .2936973
***     
  (.0596267)     
Enterprise   .2972566
***    
    (.0860172)    
Liberalisation      .2442072
***   
     (.0524514)  
Financing       .2803233
*** 






  (.1149209) (.1223151)  (.120155)  (.1271695) 
Number of 
observations 
225  225 225 225 
Number of 
instruments 
101  101 101 101 
Wald chi2 test 
Wald chi2(3)=7402.29  
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
Wald chi2(3)=6281.03 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000)
Wald chi2(3)=7032.69 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
Wald chi2(3)=6514.89 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000)
Sargan test 
chi2(97) = 113.37 
(Prob > chi2= 0.1226) 
chi2(97)  = 107.9349 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.2105)
chi2(97) = 113.031 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.1271) 
chi2(97) = 108.9009 





Order1 z = -6.1543  
(Prob > z = 0.0000) 
Order2 z =1.0702  
(Prob > z = 0.2845) 
Order1 z = -6.5171  
(Prob > z  = 0.0000) 
Order2 = 1.5359  
(Prob > z = 0.1246) 
Order1 = -6.245 
(Prob > z = 0.0000) 
Order2 = 1.42 
(Prob > z = 0.1556) 
Order1 = -6.3139  
(Prob > z = 0.0000) 
Order2 = 1.4499  
(Prob > z = 0.1471) 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms. 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Superscript 
ns absence of significance.  
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4. The Robustness Analysis 
 
With the purpose to look at a precise sphere of the institutional environment, we have hypothesized 
that the institutions more related to economic activity, in the sense of being concretely its 
supporting framework, matter and do affect the pattern of growth of the former Soviet Republics 
throughout a period of eighteen years and not simply in the first years after the USSR collapse. This 
hypothesis has been borne out by the results of the previous sections: their importance, through 
different equation models and estimation strategies, is never doubted. 
In this section, we broaden our vision and consider other variables that are typically supposed to 
influence economic growth. The goal is to discover which of these other dimensions are noteworthy 
in shaping the development path and test, at the same time, whether the magnitude and the 
significance of the economic institutions index hold
41. The covariates added are macroeconomic 
variables, “geographical” variables, “historical” variables, human capital variables and variables 
related to the kind of economic activity. More specifically, we include the net inflows of foreign 
direct investment, the inflation rates, the gross capital formation variable and the degree of 
openness, as variables describing the macroeconomic conditions; the share of land area that can be 
defined as agricultural, arable or forest area, as physical variables affecting the “material” 
conditions; dummies for intra-state wars and terrorism episodes, labelled as historical by virtue of 
the knowledge required for setting them; human capital proxies, as determinants of economic 
growth; sector-based kinds of economic activity, as variables describing the country’s productive 
specialization. 
Formally, referring to the dynamic specification due to the conceptual (path-dependence) and 
empirical importance (particular structure of our panel dataset) of the lagged dependent values, our 
specification becomes: 
 
t i i t i 2 t i 1 t i t i ecinst gdppcppp gdppcppp gdppcppp , , , , , ε + ϕ + Ξ λ + δ + γ + β + α = − −               (5) 
     
where Ξ  can alternatively be one of the control variables considered,  i ϕ are the country specific 
fixed effects and i =1,...,15. The additional covariates, as it will appear, are included one at a time 
because the lack of observations for these economies has obliged to consider different time 
horizons. 
Let us start with the first set of control variables, whose estimate results are shown in Table 9.  
                                                 
41 See for example Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002, 2005), Acemoglu and Johnson (2004), Easterly (2007), 
Knack and Keefer (1995), Rodrik (1999, 2002).  
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Table 9. Robustness Analysis: Inflation, F.D.I., and Capital Formation 
  Arellano Bond Dynamic Estimator 


















 (.0809216)  (.0843776)  (.0771395)  (.0880123) 
Inflation
42  .000926
**     .0009256
** 
 (.0004076)     (.0004177) 
F.D.I. net 
inflows
43    -.0295507
ns   -.0202134
ns 
    (.0998475)  (.104114) 
Gross Capital 
Formation
44     .0716569
ns  .0580179
ns 






  (.1132781) (.1349445) (.1304818)  (.1468356) 
Number of 
observations  225 209  216  204 
Number of 
instruments  102 67  102  96 
Wald chi2 test  chi2(4)= 7358.11 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
chi2(4)= 6376.79 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000)
chi2(4)= 6376.79 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
chi2(6)=5184.24   
(Prob>chi2=0.0000) 
Sargan test  chi2(97)=113.3415 
(Prob>chi2=0.1229) 
chi2(62)=74.93112
(Prob>chi2 =0.1255 ) 
chi2(97)=115.3121 







Order1 z = -6.2149 
(Prob > z = 0.0000) 
Order2 z = 1.1668 
(Prob > z = 0.2433) 
Order1 z = -6.0611
(Prob > z  = 0.0000) 
Order2 = 1.1998 
(Prob > z = 0.2302) 
Order1 = -6.1902 
(Prob > z = 0.0000) 
Order2 = 1.4784 
(Prob > z = 0.1393) 
Order1 = -5.9583  
(Prob > z =0.0000) 
Order2 = 1.3737 
(Prob >z = 0.1695) 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms. 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Superscript 
ns absence of significance.  












                                                 
42 Data source: World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund. 
43 Data source: World Development Indicators. Data are expressed as percentage of GDP. 
44 Data source: World Development Indicators. Data are expressed as percentage of GDP.  
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The first column of the regression results shows inflation and ecinst as regressors. Inflation, defined 
as the annual percent change of the average consumer prices, is positive and statistically significant 
at 5% level. If the evolution of inflation had followed a “spiral-shaped” pattern, the level of 
consumption would have fallen and the growth patterns have shown a fall for all the time observed. 
Actually, this is not what data say (Figure 3). Though there has been a hyperinflation period, that 
for some countries (Estonia and Latvia) ended before (1994) while for others later (1996, 1997), the 
estimate result is coherent with a “stable” evolution of prices. The magnitude and significance of 
the index of institutions is not affected by adding the inflation covariate, and the overall dynamic 
effect is less than one. The net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest in an 
enterprise operating in one of these countries (second column of the regression results
45) are not 
statistically significant. Net inflows mean that the figures used are inflows minus outflows of 
money and negative numbers that outflows of investment (or reinvestment of profits outside the 
country) exceed inflows. Accordingly to the stage of development of these countries, except the 
2006 and 2007 values of Azerbaijan, the 2000 value for Kyrgyzstan and the 1995 values of 
Uzbekistan, the figures are predominantly positive. Nevertheless, the negative sign of the estimated 
coefficient allows to think that FDI has not produced positive externalities or spillovers and has not 
spurred economic growth. Our index of economic institutions is still highly statistically significant 
and affects positively the level of GDP; also the overall dynamic effect behaves properly. The third 
regression
46 of Table 9 sees gross capital formation as additional explanatory variable. It consists of 
outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories
47. 
This covariate exhibits, as expected, a positive sign although its impact on the path of economic 
growth is not statistically significant. Also in this case, ecinst  is confirmed to be of crucial 
importance and, as it should be, the sum of the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable is 
smaller than one. Econometrically, as done before, to avoid the problem of biased estimates, we 
restrict the number
48 of lags of the dependent variable to use as instruments. The bottom rows show 
the output of the Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests, which suggest the validity of our estimation 
strategy. The last regression includes all the four covariates. Magnitude, signs and significance are 
maintained: it is economic institutions which drive economic growth. 
Our second set of covariates is about the degree of openness, which is another dimension of 
particular importance for these economies. As already said, till 1991, trade was carried out by a 
centralized organization, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).  
Having assessed the importance of dismantling the centralized organization that bore upon trade, 
captured by the ecinst index and the liberalisation sub-index, the focus here is to understand 
whether the extents of the foreign exchanges affect economic growth paths. 
                                                 
45The panel is un-balanced over  the 1991-2008 period. The results are confirmed when we reduce the time horizon 
(1994-2007) and make the panel balanced. 
46 The panel is un-balanced over the 1991-2008 period but it lacks a few observations. When we adjust to make it 
balanced, the number of observations decreases so much that the dynamic approach cannot be adopted.  
47 Fixed assets include land improvements; plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, 
railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial 
buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or 
sales, and "work in progress." (World Bank national accounts data) 
48 Differenced Sargan tests have been implemented to this regard.  
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The estimation results are displayed in Table 10
49. First, we add as regressor, beside our index, the 
openness variable. This variable, quantifying total trade and defined as the sum of exports
50 plus 
imports
51 divided by GDP, affects  positively, with statistical significance, the dependent variable. 
 
Table 10. Robustness Analysis: Degree of Openness 
  Arellano Bond Dynamic Estimator 
  Dependent variable: ln GDP p.c. PPP 
LnGDPp.c.PPPt-1  1.355749
***   
  1.346699
***   
  1.374738
***     
 
  (.0518862)      (.0519297)      (.05145)     
LnGDPp.c.PPPt-2  -.3873889
***   
  -.3816808
***   
  -.401903
***   
 
  (.0491977)      (.0490689)      (.0488666)     
Ecinst  .4407337
***   
  .452954
***   
  .4045259
***   
 
  (.0761088)       (.0761131)       (.0753049)      
Openness
52  .0603472
**       
  (.0235934)         
Exports
53    .1205051
***   
   
    (.0433142)        
Imports
54      .0753331
*   
 
      (.0407135)      
constant  -.0382932
ns     -.0131561
ns   
  -.0336032
ns   
 
  (.1179417)      (.1162677)      (.1200582)     
No. observations  222 222  222 
No. of instruments  72 72  83 
Wald chi2 test  Wald chi2(4)= 7053.49
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
Wald chi2(4)= 7130.75 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
Wald chi2(4)= 6950.66  
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
Sargan test  chi2(67) = 82.68574 
(Prob > chi2= 0.0937 ) 
chi2(67)  = 81.87192 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.1044) 
chi2(78) = 90.6571 




Order1 z = -6.058   
(Prob > z = 0.0000) 
Order2 z = 1.449   
(Prob > z = 0.1473) 
Order1 z = -6.0391   
(Prob > z  = 0.0000) 
Order2 = 1.3372   
(Prob > z = 0.1812) 
Order1 = -6.2352   
(Prob > z = 0.0000) 
Order2 = 1.4843   
(Prob > z = 0.1377) 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms. 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Superscript 
ns absence of significance.  
The number in parenthesis are standard errors. Wald tests the null that the intercept is the only determinant of growth. 
 
 
                                                 
49 The panel models are unbalanced over the 1991-2008 period. To make it balanced, the time horizon is reduced to 
1993-2007 and the results are confirmed. 
50Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the 
world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other 
services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. 
They exclude labor and property income (formerly called factor services) as well as transfer payments. (World Bank 
National Accounts Data) 
51 Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services received from the rest of the 
world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other 
services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. 
They exclude labor and property income (formerly called factor services) as well as transfer payments. (World Bank 
National Accounts Data) 
52 Author’s calculation. Data are from World Development Indicators Database and expressed in current US $. 
53 Author’s calculation. Data are from World Development Indicators Database and expressed in current US $. 
54 Author’s calculation. Data are from World Development Indicators Database and expressed in current US $.  
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The other two regressions study disjointedly the impact of exports and imports. Indeed, we break 
the openness indicator to obtain an exports indicator, defined as exports divided by GDP, and an 
imports indicator, symmetrically defined. Their estimated coefficients are both positive, but exports 
variable is more statistically significant. Our “core” variable continues to be highly significant and 
keep its magnitude. As before, the number
55 of lags of the dependent variable to use as instruments 
have been restricted; the Sargan test and the Arellano-Bond one give the expected results. Of 
course, this analysis does not make any distinction between trade partners. From the economic 
policy point of view, taking into account their composition and see how much of the FSU 
economies trade relationships is still “internal” would have interesting implications. 
The following table shows another set of additional explanatory variables.  
 
Table 11. Robustness Analysis: Geographical Variables. 
  Arellano Bond Dynamic Estimator 



















ns       
  (.2861044)         
Arable Land
57    .1329882
ns   
    (.2436606)   
Forest Area
58      2.108469
ns 
      (1.880511) 
constant  -.0053456
ns      -.0395487
ns  -.3427743
ns 
  (.283797)      (.2277809)  (.3687031) 
Number of 
observations  165 165  165 
Number of 
instruments  35 35  35 
Wald chi2 test  Wald chi2(4)= 3261.85
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
Wald chi2(4)= 3293.73 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
Wald chi2(4)= 3386.05 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
Sargan test  chi2(30) = 34.65451 
(Prob > chi2=0.2554) 
chi2(30)  = 37.39681 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.1659) 
chi2(30) = 33.00778 




Order1 z = -4.1324 
(Prob > z = 0.0000) 
Order2 z = .46552 
(Prob > z = 0.6416) 
Order1 z = -4.0798 
(Prob > z  = 0.0000) 
Order2 = .4351 
(Prob > z = 0.6635) 
Order1 = -4.1456 
(Prob > z = 0.0000) 
Order2 = .44683 
(Prob > z = 0.6550) 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms. 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Superscript 
ns absence of significance.  
The number in parenthesis are standard errors. Wald tests the null that the intercept is the only determinant of growth. 
 
                                                 
55 Differenced Sargan tests have been implemented to this regard. 
56 Data source: World Development Indicators. Data are expressed as percentage of land area. 
57 Data source: World Development Indicators. Data are expressed as percentage of land area. 
58 Data source: World Development Indicators. Data are expressed as percentage of land area.  
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Cross-country studies of the link between development and institutions include (for example, see 
Easterly, Rodrik, and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson) geographical variables, such as the 
distance from equator, latitude, or a dummy variable denoting if the country is landlocked. Because 
these features are constant over time and the associated variables cannot be used in panel models, 
we look for geographical variables with a certain degree of variability. These variables are those 
displayed in first column of Table 11
59. Agricultural Land, Arable Land and Forest Area are not 
statistically significant, although their estimated coefficients are positive, and their inclusion does 
not change the significance and the impact of economic institutions on GDP. From the 
econometrical point of view, the output tests in the bottom rows validate the strategy followed. 
 
Table 12. Robustness Analysis: Historical Variables 
  Arellano Bond Dynamic Estimator 












 (.0752938)  (.0864238) 
War
60  .0167024
ns   
 (.0248271)   
Terrorism
61    -.0228594
** 




  (.1170636) (.1531778) 
Number of 
observations  225 196 
Number of 
instruments  93 44 
Wald chi2 test  Wald chi2(4)= 7160.63 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
Wald chi2(4)= 4851.40 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
Sargan test  chi2(88) = 101.7571 
(Prob > chi2=0.1499) 
chi2(39)  = 43.8392 




Order1 z = -6.2709 
(Prob > z = 0.0000) 
Order2 z = 1.322 
(Prob > z = 0.1862) 
Order1 z = -5.7054 
(Prob > z  = 0.0000) 
Order2 =1.2001 
(Prob > z = 0.2301) 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms. 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Superscript 
ns absence of significance.  
The number in parenthesis are standard errors. Wald tests the null that the intercept is the only determinant of growth. 
 
Above, we show what happens when our basic dynamic model includes the explanatory variables 
we have labelled as historical. These are war and terrorism. The first regression equation
62 
embodies the former, a civil-war dummy variable, that assigns 1 to the country that in a given year 
goes through a conflict, and 0 otherwise: the Azerbaijan vs. Nagorno-Karabakh war, an armed 
                                                 
59 The panel is balanced for all the regressions and cover the 1992-2005 period. 
60 Author’ s calculations. Data source: Correlates of War Database supported by our knowledge.  
61 Author’s calculations. Data source: Global Terrorism Database.  
62 The panel is balanced and cover the 1991-2008 period.  
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conflict that took place in the small enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in southwestern Azerbaijan 
(1991-1994)
63; the Georgia vs. Gamsakurdia & Abkaz war, from 1991 to 1994, a civil war for 
control of central government, and the 2008 South Ossetia war; the Russia vs. Chechens war, with 
its different phases, the first from 1994 to 1996, the second from 1999 to 2008; Tadzhikistan vs. 
Popular Democratic Army war for control of central government, from 1992 to 1997; the 1991-
1992 Moldova vs. Transnistria conflict. The empirical results say that war does not matter for the 
path of economic growth. Its estimated coefficient, as displayed in Table 12, is positive, but 
statistically insignificant: the positive sign is soon understood if we think of the spur wars might 
have given to specific sectors of the industrial production.  The other regression
64 studies the effects 
of terrorist attacks on the level of per capita GDP: the terrorism dummy variable is statistically 
significant and affects negatively the path of growth. The negative sign is expected because 
terrorism generates fear and increases, to a greater extent, uncertainty for the economic agents. In 
any case the dependent variable is affected by our index of institutions: they maintain a high 
statistical significance, magnitude and positive sign. Both the Sargan and the Arellano-Bond tests 
give the expected results. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions on the instruments, 
restricted, as before, to avoid biased estimates caused by the correlation among lagged dependent 
variable and individual errors, confirms our strategy; the Arellano-Bond test, that there is no second 
order autocorrelation in the residuals and inferences are valid. 
To understand which role human capital has in shaping the path of economic performance and its 
importance with respect to economic institutions, we use three different proxies: school enrolment 
primary
65 (%gross), school enrolment secondary
66 (%gross), school enrolment tertiary
67 (%gross). 
Actually, only the last indicator is commonly used as a skill or human capital proxy, being the first 
two indicators basically recognised as literacy ones. 
Due to the problem of data availability, all the countries are restricted to shorter time series, 
covering the 1999-2007 time horizon, and the sample is reduced to fourteen countries
68. For this, 
the dynamic specification cannot be implemented because of the small sample bias and the static 
approach explained before is to be followed. 
Looking carefully at the data
69 (Table 13), two facts are noticed: these countries have very high 
enrolment rates for the primary and secondary education; the between standard deviation of the 
                                                 
63 It started in 1988; before our reference time horizon. 
64 The panel is balanced and cover the 1991-2007 period. Turkmenistan is excluded because of unreliable data: the only 
“sure” terrorist event is the attack vs.  President Nyazov, November 2002. (Source: US Department of State).  
65 Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that 
officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Primary education provides children with basic reading, writing, 
and mathematics skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, geography, natural science, 
social science, art, and music. Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
Institute for Statistics. Note: Break in series between 1997 and 1998 due to due to change from International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED76) to ISCED97. Recent data are provisional. (source: World Development 
Indicators) 
66 Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that 
officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education 
that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human development, by 
offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more specialized teachers. Source: United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. Note: Break in series between 
1997 and 1998 due to due to change from International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED76) to ISCED97. 
Recent data are provisional. (source: World Development Indicators) 
67 Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that 
officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Tertiary education, whether or not to an advanced research 
qualification, normally requires, as a minimum condition of admission, the successful completion of education at the 
secondary level. Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for 
Statistics. Note: Break in series between 1997 and 1998 due to due to change from International Standard Classification 
of Education (ISCED76) to ISCED97. Recent data are provisional. (source: World Development Indicators) 
68 Turkmenistan has been excluded because of absence of data.  
69 Data source: World Development Indicators.  
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tertiary education is greater than the within standard deviation, meaning that more advanced levels 
of education are very different among the former soviet socialist republics. 
 
Table 13.  Education Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean  Std.  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Primary      
Overall  1.004415     .0549329     .9361035     1.212228 
Between    .0321688     .9632928     1.063295 
Within    .045334     .8985614     1.153348 
Secondary      
Overall  .9006865     .0685229     .7380635     1.033035 
Between    .0614509     .7935758     .9940092 
Within    .0329186     .8189493     .9785237 
Tertiary      
Overall  .4272115      .206088     .0962687     .7645731 
Between    .2061059     .1225314     .7044486 
Within    .0621053     .2158705     .5816467 
 
Let us focus on the role of the primary and secondary education levels. We regress the per capita 
GDP values (in logarithmic terms) on the economic institutions index and the school enrolment 
rates (%gross), following the static specification, shown in Section 4.1, that now becomes:  
 
t i t i t i t i t i lment schoolenro ecinst gdppcppp , , , , ε + ψ + ϕ + γ + β + α =                          (6) 
 
where  lment schoolenro can alternatively be referred to either the primary or the secondary 
enrolment rate,  t i, ε are the idiosyncratic errors, and  i ϕ  captures the country fixed effects. In this 
case, the time dummies, although statistically significant, are not added. Indeed, their inclusion 
would be burdensome in terms of degree of freedom due to the reduced number of observations and 
the presence of missing values.  
The estimation results are displayed in the next table (Table 14). 
The estimated coefficient of the primary level of education, first regression, is not statistically 
significant. This result is totally expected if we recall that each of these economies shows very high 
primary enrolment rates, as confirmed also by the value of the overall mean in the sample. 
Therefore, primary education does not affect economic growth. A different result is founded for the 
secondary level of education. Considering the other regression, last column, the estimate of the 
coefficient linked to the education aiming at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human 
development is found to have a positive and statistical significant impact on the dependent variable. 
This is expected too, because the countries, on average, exhibit lower rates, and also the overall 
mean value, as well as the values of the related summary statistics, are definitely smaller. The 
importance of ecinst is confirmed once again, even over a different span of years (1999-2007). The 
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Table 14. Robustness Analysis: Literacy  
Two-way fixed effects estimator with Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors 




  (.8368069) (.5417887) 
Primary
70  .8159668
ns   
  (.5152589)   
Secondary
71   1.397197
*** 




  (.993907) (.5781753) 




The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms.  
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Superscript 
ns absence of significance. 
The number in parenthesis are standard errors.  
 
The summary statistics above highlight the “anomaly” of the FSU countries: they have very high 
enrolment rates and even low income countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), that are 
“expected” to be less literate, exhibit high rates with respect to primary and secondary education. 
The scenario seems to be considerably different for the rate of investment in human capital. For the 
tertiary education, because of these differences among the countries, we split the sample in two 
subgroups and thus distinguish between low human capital-intensive countries and high human 
capital intensive ones. It being understood that a caveat must be placed upon the resulting number 
of observations of the new samples, this particular dataset structure implies that it is worth studying 
whether the impact of human capital on economic development is different for the low human 
capital intensive countries and the high human capital intensive ones. 
From the methodological point of view, we calculate the mean of the time series of the school 
enrolment rates for each country and label as low tertiary those countries with an average rate 
smaller than 42% (the overall mean). They are Armenia (27.08%), Azerbaijan (15.58%), Georgia 
(39.84%), Kazakhstan (41.36%), Kyrgyzstan (39.26%), Moldova (34.83%), Tajikistan (15.81%), 
Uzbekistan (12.25%). The high tertiary countries are Belarus (59.82%), Estonia (61.49%), Latvia 
(66.98%), Lithuania (64.66%), Russia (70.44%) and Ukraine (60.94%). Although the former group 
may be seen as “non homogenous”, since there is a certain degree of variation between the 
countries
72, we prefer this choice anyway. Indeed it is the more coherent, considering the necessity 
of a clear benchmark and that the alternative strategy to “move” Kazakhstan (the low tertiary 
country with the greatest mean value) in the high tertiary group would not reduce markedly the 
between variation of the low tertiary group
73, but would lead to pick out also Georgia and 
Kyrgyzstan as “bordering” countries. Consequently, this would call for the definition of another 
subgroup, which cannot be done because of the limited number of observations.    
To assess the impact of human capital, proxied by the tertiary school enrolment rate, we follow the 
model equation defined in (6). For both the high tertiary and low tertiary group, ecinst is positive 
and statistically significant at five and one percent significance levels, respectively. Economic 
institutions are again the major determinant of the economic patterns. Human capital, as 
hypothesized, behaves very differently, in terms of the impact on economic outcomes. It matters (at 
                                                 
70 Data source: World Development Indicators. 
71 Data source: World Development Indicators. 
72 The between standard deviation for the low tertiary sub-sample is equal to 0.122. 
73 The between standard deviation for the low tertiary sub-sample, once Kazakhstan is moved, is equal to 0.1188.  
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five percent level) only for countries with skills below the average rate. When countries are more 
human capital intensive, the coefficient for the tertiary school enrolment rate, although positive, 
does not have a statistically significant impact for the path of economic growth.  
 
Table 15.  Robustness Analysis: Human Capital  
Two-way fixed effects estimator with Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors 
  Dependent variable: Ln GDP p.c. P.P.P. 
  High Tertiary Group  Low Tertiary Group 
Ecinst  4.854598
**   
  8.532123
***    
  (1.509393) (1.061628) 
Tertiary  .3420076
ns   
  .6113308
**    
  (.5381865)       (.2658141)      
constant  5.451743
***   
  2.241539
***    
  (.7427204)       (.5912529) 




The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms.  
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Superscript 
ns absence of significance. 
The number in parenthesis are standard errors.  
 
The last set of additional covariates considered includes those variables quantifying the government 
expenditure





78, following the International 
Standard Industrial Classification). From a strictly quantitative point of view, the data
79 available 
demanded attention. These variables are measured either in monetary terms or as a percentage of 
                                                 
74 General government final consumption expenditure (formerly general government consumption) includes all 
government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also 
includes most expenditures on national defense and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are 
part of government capital formation. (source World Development Indicators) 
75 Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of 
crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting 
intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC), revision 3. (source: World Development Indicators) 
76 Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It comprises value 
added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value 
added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of 
value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. (source: World 
Development Indicators) 
77
 Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Value added is the net output of a sector after 
adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. (source: World Development Indicators) 
78 Services correspond to ISIC divisions 50-99 and they include value added in wholesale and retail trade (including 
hotels and restaurants), transport, and government, financial, professional, and personal services such as education, 
health care, and real estate services. Also included are imputed bank service charges, import duties, and any statistical 
discrepancies noted by national compilers as well as discrepancies arising from rescaling. Value added is the net output 
of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The industrial origin of value added 
is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. (source: World Development 
Indicators). 
79 Data source: World Development Indicators.  
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GDP. Because the monetary series, although in constant prices, lack several observations and 
further are not expressed in the same unit of measurement as the dependent variable, we choose to 
use the ones expressed as percentage of GDP. But again, the estimate results of the static and 
dynamic specification with the alternated presence of these covariates (expressed as percent of 
GDP) were doubtful, due to the presence of a certain degree of correlation. Thus, considering also 
that the within standard deviation of each variable is rather small
80, we decide to study the effect the 
initial
81 composition of a country’s production and the initial (1991) level of government 
expenditure have had on the subsequent growth path. 
To keep including the country fixed effects, whose importance has been largely attested, and to 
avoid that our time invariant covariates were dropped, which of course would happen with the 
adoption of the LSDV estimator, we perform an OLS robust regression, where the dependent 
variable is per capita GDP (in purchasing power parity as usual) and the regressors are our index of 
economic institutions and, agriculture, government expenditure, industry, manufacturing and 
services added one at a time. Table 16 shows the estimate results when only country dummies are 
included; Table 17, the results whit both country and time dummies. 
  
Table 16. Robustness Analysis: kinds of economic activity and government expenditure  
OLS Robust Estimator with time-invariant variables 







 (.1723934)  (.1723934)  (.1723934)  (.1723934)  (.1723934) 
Agriculture  -.056926
***       
 (.0030305)         
GovExpenditure    .0547216
***      
   (.0080039)       
Industry     .0522089
***    
     (.0070946)     
Manufacturing      .0259873
***   
       (.0035314)   
Services         .0928696
*** 







  (.1360067)  (.159356) (.2816756)  (.1188481)  (.2020533) 
Country dummies  yes yes yes  yes yes 
Time dummies  no no no  no no 




F( 15, 254)=147.85 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(15, 254)=147.85 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(15,254)=147.85 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(15,254)=147.85 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared        0.8539  0.8539  0.8539  0.8539  0.8539 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms.  
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Superscript 
ns absence of significance. 
The number in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
 
                                                 
80 Agriculture: .0721463; Government Expenditure: .034549; Industry: .0694635; Manufacturing: .0552209; Services: 
.0961473.    
81 The first observation  of the Manufacturing variable for Georgia is the 1996 one, for Moldova is the 1993 one, for 
Russia the 2002 one, for Turkmenistan the 1993 one, for Ukraine the 1992 one and for Uzbekistan the 1994 one. For 
Kazakhstan the observations for all these variables start 1992.  
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Table 17. Robustness Analysis: kinds of economic activity and government expenditure  
OLS Robust Estimator with time-invariant variables 







  (.2219737) (.2219737) (.2219737)  (.2219737) (.2219737) 
Agriculture  -.0569555
***        
  (.0015006)        
GovExpenditure    .054372
***      
   (.0043056)      
Industry     .0529639
***    
     (.0052142)    
Manufacturing      .0263631
***  
       (.0025954)   
Services         .0932304
*** 







  (.1729279)  (.1517358) (.1397967) (.109806)  (.1518513) 
Country dummies  yes yes yes  yes yes 
Time dummies  yes yes yes  yes yes 
N 270  270  270  270  270 
F test 
F( 32, 237)= 412.64 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(32, 237) = 412.64
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(32,237)= 412.64 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(32,237)=412.64 
Prob > F= 0.0000 
F(32,237)= 412.64 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared        0.9650  0.9650  0.9650  0.9650  0.9650 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), expressed in logarithmic terms.  
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Superscript 
ns absence of significance. 
The number in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
 
Both estimation strategies give evidence of the significance and importance of economic 
institutions, which maintain sign and magnitude. The initial level of agriculture, as theoretically 
expected, has affected negatively and significantly the subsequent pattern of economic 
development. The other sectors, industry, manufacturing
82, and services, as well as the consumption 
expenditure of the government, have had instead a positive and statistically significant impact on 










                                                 
82 The inclusion of manufacturing is somewhat redundant because the industry sector, as defined before, include the 
manufacturing one.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
Studying the economic growth of the former Soviet Socialist Republics was a real challenge. It has 
required special efforts to collect and manipulate data, which were sometimes lacking, sometimes 
affected by price distortions, to find and understand how to outline, in an exhaustive way, the 
historical features delineating their common background. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt 
to study the economic growth paths of these countries, and we choose them because, “thanks” to 
their unique experience, are an extremely powerful example for the analysis of the role of 
institutions.  
Conceptual problems are often ascribed to the existing research strategy about the causal link 
between institutions and growth. In particular, these are closely related to the use of generic and not 
precisely defined assessments of institutional outcomes, to the fact that, of course, it is impossible 
to conduct an experiment and see what would happen if an exogenous event occurred and the 
institutional set of a country changed, and that the institutional variables chosen are not read as the 
result of the policy makers’ manipulation.  
Former Soviet Union economies, we believe, offer an empirical “case” that goes in the direction to 
deal with these problems. First, the historical study of their past allows to focus on a well precisely 
defined set of institutions, the ones we have defined as necessary for a market economy, captured 
by the economic institutions index (ecinst). Second, the 1991 breakdown entails the collapse of a 
specific institutional arrangement, that is not our task to “call”, and the passage to a market 
economy system: this makes a radical institutional change happen and thus history gives us an 
experiment similar to the ones typical of the natural sciences. Third, the institutional indicators 
used, selected by virtue of the historical considerations made, allows to explicitly think about the 
hand of the policy makers and the role of the economic policy. It is clear that the degree of 
development of the financial system, for instance, but the same may go for all the other institutional 
dimensions considered, depends on the actions of the policy maker.  
Our first hypothesis is that the economic institutions index, built from the EBRD indicators, has 
affected the economic paths of these countries since 1991. This, tested via a static and a dynamic 
approach, is always borne out. Because of the particular structure of our panel dataset, we have 
adopted multiple estimation strategies to find the estimator able to assess the coefficient at best: in 
the static framework, the two-way fixed effects estimator with Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors is 
preferred; in the dynamic context, the GMM-difference estimator. All the regression equations 
agree and generate the same result: economic institutions are a great determinant and drive the 
economic development pattern. Our second hypothesis concerns the role of these economic 
institutions. More precisely, due to the specific condition of the FSU countries, we have 
hypothesized that economic institutions are the major force shaping the economic outcomes. To this 
regard, with the additional goal to understand which other forces have influenced the time 
behaviour of the per capita GDP, we have performed a robustness analysis, where the economic 
institutions index is compared with macroeconomic variables, the “classical” determinants of 
growth, historical dummies, variables representing foreign trade relationships and the kinds of 
economic activity. Using the dynamic model approach, we have been able to show the persistence 
of the magnitude and significance of our core covariate and which, among the other control 
variables, have played a role. Whatever regressor is added, ecinst is confirmed to have a strong 
effect on GDP.  
The results of this paper are not the generic statement “institutions do matter”. We say something 
more than the importance of a generic set of institutions for a particular set of countries and we 
believe that replicating the reasoning on an enlarged scale of countries, provided that economic 
institutions assessments are available, would prove very fruitful. 
Indeed, we have shown neither the importance, for instance, of the security of property rights, nor 
of economic freedom, but the importance of a specific set of institutions for a set of countries, 
assumed to have come into existence, to a certain extent, in 1991. This set matters for the all time  
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horizon and not only for the first years after the breakdown. The former Soviet Union Economies 
are still classified as transition economies because they have experienced central planning. But 
transition, as the word says, cannot last eighteen years or more. From the economic point of view, 
transition started when the USSR collapsed and ended when the Soviet Socialist Republics became 
autonomous and organized the economic activity accordingly to a market economy system. To this 
regard, they needed a set of institutions, whose evolution matter for the economic outcome. That’s 
the reason underlying our results.  
However, the degree of the quality of that institutional framework can vary. We have said that this 
measure of institutions lets think about the hand of the policy makers. If institutions matter and are 
read as shaped by the economic policy, we must conclude that economic policy matters for growth. 
Future research on this area should be devoted to discover the determinants of the economic 






































































LargePriv  1.0000             
SmallPriv  0.8917    1.0000            
Enterprise  0.8556    0.8159   1.0000          




0.8409    0.8800   0.7885   0.8250   1.0000      
Competition 
Policy  0.7026    0.7114   0.7603   0.5817   0.6475    1.0000    
Banking 
Reform  0.8144    0.8214   0.9133   0.7139   0.8402    0.7634    1.0000  
NonBanking 
Reform  0.6917    0.6732   0.7596   0.4973   0.6089    0.8131    0.7887   1.0000 
Source: Author’s calculation  
 







Large-scale privatisation  
¾  1=Little private ownership 
¾  2= Comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation; some sales completed. 
¾  3= More than 25 per cent of large-scale enterprise assets in private hands or in the process of  
being privatised (with the process having reached a stage at which the state has effectively 
ceded its ownership rights), but possibly with major unresolved issues regarding corporate 
governance. 
¾  4= More than 50 per cent of state-owned enterprise and farm assets in private ownership and 
significant progress with corporate governance of these enterprises. 
¾  4+= Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: more than 75 per 
cent of enterprise assets in private ownership with effective corporate governance. 
Small-scale privatisation 
¾  1= Little progress. 
¾  2= Substantial share privatised.  
¾  3= Comprehensive programme almost ready for implementation.  
¾  4= Complete privatisation of small companies with tradable ownership rights.  
¾  4+= Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: no state 
ownership of small enterprises; effective tradability of land. 
Governance and enterprise restructuring 
¾  1= Soft budget constraints (lax credit and subsidy policies weakening financial discipline at 
the enterprise level); few other reforms to promote corporate governance. 
¾  2= Moderately tight credit and subsidy policy, but weak enforcement of bankruptcy 
legislation and little action taken to strengthen competition and corporate governance. 
¾  3= Significant and sustained actions to harden budget constraints and to promote corporate 
governance effectively (for example, privatisation combined with tight credit and subsidy 
policies and/or enforcement of bankruptcy legislation).  
¾  4= Substantial improvement in corporate governance and significant new investment at the 
enterprise level, including minority holdings by financial investors.  
¾  4+= Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: effective 
corporate control exercised through domestic financial institutions and markets, fostering 
market-driven restructuring.  
Price liberalisation  
¾  1= Most prices formally controlled by the government. 
¾  2= Some lifting of price administration; state procurement at non-market prices for the 
majority of product categories. 
¾  3= Significant progress on price liberalisation, but state procurement at non-market prices 
remains substantial. 
¾  4= Comprehensive price liberalisation; state procurement at non-market prices largely 
phased out; only a small number of administered prices remain.  
¾  4+= Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: complete price 
liberalisation with no price control outside housing, transport and natural monopolies.  
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Trade and foreign exchange system 
¾  1= Widespread import and/or export controls or very limited legitimate access to foreign 
exchange. 
¾  2= Some liberalisation of import and/or export controls; almost full current account 
convertibility in principle, but with a foreign exchange regime that is not fully transparent 
(possibly with multiple exchange rates).  
¾  3= Removal of almost all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions; 
almost full current account convertibility.  
¾  4= Removal of all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions (apart from 
agriculture) and all significant export tariffs; insignificant direct involvement in exports and 
imports by ministries and state-owned trading companies; no major non-uniformity of 
customs duties for non-agricultural goods and services; full and current account 
convertibility.  
¾  4+= Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: removal of most 
tariff barriers; membership in WTO.  
Competition policy  
¾  1= No competition legislation and institutions. 
¾  2= Competition policy legislation and institutions set up; some reduction of entry 
restrictions or enforcement action on dominant firms.  
¾  3= Some enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a 
competitive environment, including break-ups of dominant conglomerates; substantial 
reduction of entry restrictions. 
¾  4= Significant enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a 
competitive environment. 
¾  4+= Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: effective 
enforcement of competition policy; unrestricted entry to most markets.  
Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation  
¾  1= Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system. 
¾  2= Significant liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed 
credit or interest rate ceilings. 
¾  3= Substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for prudential 
supervision and regulation; full interest rate liberalisation with little preferential access to 
cheap refinancing; significant lending to private enterprises and significant presence of 
private banks.  
¾  4= Significant movement of banking laws and regulations towards BIS standards; well-
functioning banking competition and effective prudential supervision; significant term 
lending to private enterprises; substantial financial deepening.  
¾  4+= Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence 
of banking laws and regulations with BIS standards; provision of full set of competitive 
banking services.  
Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions  
¾  1= Little progress.  
¾  2= Formation of securities exchanges, market-makers and brokers; some trading in 
government paper and/or securities; rudimentary legal and regulatory framework for the 
issuance and trading of securities. 
¾  3= Substantial issuance of securities by private enterprises; establishment of independent 
share registries, secure clearance and settlement procedures, and some protection of 
minority shareholders; emergence of non-bank financial institutions (for example, 
investment funds, private insurance and pension funds, leasing companies) and associated 
regulatory framework.   
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¾  4= Securities laws and regulations approaching IOSCO standards; substantial market 
liquidity and capitalisation; well-functioning non-bank financial institutions and effective 
regulation. 
¾  4+= Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence 
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